In the brilliant and incisive ISIS: The State of Terror, policy consultant and Harvard academic Jessica Stern and extremism expert JM Berger enjoin the West to not lose its essential character in the fight against ISIS. The reference is here is to Enlightenment values that define the contemporary West. The clear-cut implication in terms of dealing with ISIS is that there is no pure military solution to the problem; if at all there is a solution, it lies in the synthesis of the military, the political and the social.
ISIS, in the schema elaborated by Stern and Berger, is in a different league from other extremist establishments. Its ideology, operations, organizational structure, logistics and recruitment patterns mark it a militant group that will alter the nature of insurgencies and violent extremism. Terming it as a "hybrid" between a terror group and an insurgent outfit, Stern and Berger describe ISIS as a paradigm displacer.
ISIS vs. Al-Qaeda
The group was incubated in post Gulf War II Iraq due to the political vacuum created by the de-Ba'athification of Iraq's power political structures (including the military and the bureaucracy) and the disturbing of the religio-ethnic balance in favour of the Shiites. ISIS, according to Stern and Berger, was initially in the nature of an offshoot of Al-Qaeda (Central) run at first by a "born again" Jihadist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who exploited the sectarian fault lines of Iraq. It was, however, in the prisons of occupation authorities that ISIS actually took form. Relationships were forged in prisons and plans laid out for the crystallization of an armed insurgency and terrorism. ISIS initially suffered setbacks, its deadliness and effectiveness coming much later. Its consolidation was gradual and it chose an obscure Islamic theology scholar, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as its leader.
Stern and Berger tell us that as ISIS gained power, prestige and consolidated itself, it gradually but inexorably split from Al-Qaeda. The differences between Al-Qaeda and ISIS accrued over ideology, tactics and strategy. A key point of departure was the elevation of ultra-violence as a central and cardinal tenet by ISIS. While Al-Qaeda's conscious self-perception was that of a vanguard whose spectacular violent acts would arouse the Muslim masses, ISIS was more in the nature of a proto-state which was territorial and employed the techniques of asymmetric warfare to deadly effect. The elemental difference between the two, however, according to Stern and Berger, lay in the ideational and ideological superstructure of the two. Al-Qaeda's doctrines and ideas and its operational modus operandi were forged in the crucible of weakness; its assumptions were longue durée and it did not promise anything concrete. On the contrary, ISIS, was, in the words of Stern and Berger, in the "here and the now"; it not only offered brutal violence to its adherents but also honour and dignity.
Violence, terror and the online space
The brutal techniques employed by ISIS, of which Zarqawi was a forerunner, are owed to a jihadi text written by an ideologue known as Abu Bakr Naji (real name not known). Titled "The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage that the Ummah will Pass", the tract was, according to Stern and Berger, in the nature of a "learning curve"--a compilation of lessons learnt from previous failures. Al Naji, holding the use and depiction of violence as key, rooted for the use of lethal, unvarnished violence as a tool to motivate would-be recruits and demoralize enemies. This explains ISIS's recourse to beheadings and other spectacular and brutal forms of violence.
Given the ubiquity of social media, the attendant "democratization of technology", and the conventional media's reflex to report the spectacular, ISIS--as a modern movement-- seized these as opportunities to amplify its message, brutality and approach. Twitter was, in this schema, the weapon of choice for the militant group; ISIS employed it dexterously and to deadly effect. One example of this dexterity is the 'marketing' of the group's nature, aims, force and reach through social media and then aligning it with battlefield success, giving the group "credibility" and making it real and potent.
The group's recruitment techniques and patterns, which also leverage the ubiquity and reach of social media, are markedly different from Al-Qaeda, Stern and Berger posit. While there is no mono-causal reason or explanation for the group's appeal to potential recruits, the most prominent age group that is drawn to ISIS is the cohort that is in transition. Structurally, ISIS has been designed to withstand "decapitation"--the elimination of its leadership--and it operates like a proto-state.
The key challenge for ISIS, after it announced itself to be the "Caliphate" under the leadership of al-Baghdadi is sustainability. The group may, because of its ultra-violence, self destruct or may linger on as a residual and rump force it has essentially changed the character and nature of global jihad, so much so that Al-Qaeda, the group's progenitor, has been left scrambling to catch up. ISIS seeks a violent confrontation with the West; its provocative attacks and beheadings and the capture of symbolic towns like Dabiq where, according to Sunni eschatology, the end of time will occur with the arrival of the Mahdi, reflects the apocalyptic nature of the group.
A multi-pronged strategy
By way of recommendations and suggestions in dealing with ISIS, Stern and Berger caution Western policy makers and politicians to not be "reactive" or to overreact-- precisely the goals of ISIS which wants the West to be drawn into the Middle East. Stern and Berger propose a holistic approach that synthesizes military, social and political interventions and leads to the "rotting up" of the group.
Stern and Berger have done a fantastic job of dissecting ISIS, its ideology, formative premises, its end game, goals and modus operandi. The feat is all the more laudable given the paucity of real information about the group, the dangers of probing and seeking primary sources and other relevant research techniques.
The book then draws from history, takes recourse to analogy, and draws inferences and extrapolates from available sources and information. Vigorous methodologies have been employed to arrive at a description of the group and other ancillary but allied themes. Stern and Berger cannot be faulted for their academic vigour and the copiousness of their research.
But where does Islam figure?
However, while the book is admittedly about ISIS and axiomatically delineates the nature, form and goals of the group, Stern and Berger hardly pay attention to the historical dimensions of the anarchic void that gave birth to it. Moreover, a discussion on Islam has been elided. It is not clear whether this accrues from political correctness or the authors' specializations. The question(s) that could have been discussed at length could have been whether there is Islam in ISIS or is ISIS in Islam?
I personally believe that Islam, or at least certain interpretations of the religion and its history, appears to be employed by ISIS to justify "retribution" against what the group believes to be the source of the Middle East's torturous, convoluted and painful modern history. This selective appropriation of texts and history, while useful for ISIS, is reductive and conveys the impression that Islam is essentially violent. The author challenges this impression but for the Western reader, the best review could perhaps have been provided by Stern and Berger. Alas, neither have chosen to do so which suggests that both authors speak from the vantage point of the West and for the West--an ethnocentrism that is disappointing, to say the least.
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Terming it as a "hybrid" between a terror group and an insurgent outfit, Stern and Berger describe ISIS as a paradigm displacer.
ISIS, in the schema elaborated by Stern and Berger, is in a different league from other extremist establishments. Its ideology, operations, organizational structure, logistics and recruitment patterns mark it a militant group that will alter the nature of insurgencies and violent extremism. Terming it as a "hybrid" between a terror group and an insurgent outfit, Stern and Berger describe ISIS as a paradigm displacer.
ISIS vs. Al-Qaeda
The group was incubated in post Gulf War II Iraq due to the political vacuum created by the de-Ba'athification of Iraq's power political structures (including the military and the bureaucracy) and the disturbing of the religio-ethnic balance in favour of the Shiites. ISIS, according to Stern and Berger, was initially in the nature of an offshoot of Al-Qaeda (Central) run at first by a "born again" Jihadist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who exploited the sectarian fault lines of Iraq. It was, however, in the prisons of occupation authorities that ISIS actually took form. Relationships were forged in prisons and plans laid out for the crystallization of an armed insurgency and terrorism. ISIS initially suffered setbacks, its deadliness and effectiveness coming much later. Its consolidation was gradual and it chose an obscure Islamic theology scholar, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as its leader.
ISIS, was, in the words of Stern and Berger, in the "here and the now"; it not only offered brutal violence to its adherents but also honour and dignity.
Stern and Berger tell us that as ISIS gained power, prestige and consolidated itself, it gradually but inexorably split from Al-Qaeda. The differences between Al-Qaeda and ISIS accrued over ideology, tactics and strategy. A key point of departure was the elevation of ultra-violence as a central and cardinal tenet by ISIS. While Al-Qaeda's conscious self-perception was that of a vanguard whose spectacular violent acts would arouse the Muslim masses, ISIS was more in the nature of a proto-state which was territorial and employed the techniques of asymmetric warfare to deadly effect. The elemental difference between the two, however, according to Stern and Berger, lay in the ideational and ideological superstructure of the two. Al-Qaeda's doctrines and ideas and its operational modus operandi were forged in the crucible of weakness; its assumptions were longue durée and it did not promise anything concrete. On the contrary, ISIS, was, in the words of Stern and Berger, in the "here and the now"; it not only offered brutal violence to its adherents but also honour and dignity.
Violence, terror and the online space
The brutal techniques employed by ISIS, of which Zarqawi was a forerunner, are owed to a jihadi text written by an ideologue known as Abu Bakr Naji (real name not known). Titled "The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage that the Ummah will Pass", the tract was, according to Stern and Berger, in the nature of a "learning curve"--a compilation of lessons learnt from previous failures. Al Naji, holding the use and depiction of violence as key, rooted for the use of lethal, unvarnished violence as a tool to motivate would-be recruits and demoralize enemies. This explains ISIS's recourse to beheadings and other spectacular and brutal forms of violence.
Given the ubiquity of social media... and the conventional media's reflex to report the spectacular, ISIS seized these as opportunities to amplify its message...
Given the ubiquity of social media, the attendant "democratization of technology", and the conventional media's reflex to report the spectacular, ISIS--as a modern movement-- seized these as opportunities to amplify its message, brutality and approach. Twitter was, in this schema, the weapon of choice for the militant group; ISIS employed it dexterously and to deadly effect. One example of this dexterity is the 'marketing' of the group's nature, aims, force and reach through social media and then aligning it with battlefield success, giving the group "credibility" and making it real and potent.
The group's recruitment techniques and patterns, which also leverage the ubiquity and reach of social media, are markedly different from Al-Qaeda, Stern and Berger posit. While there is no mono-causal reason or explanation for the group's appeal to potential recruits, the most prominent age group that is drawn to ISIS is the cohort that is in transition. Structurally, ISIS has been designed to withstand "decapitation"--the elimination of its leadership--and it operates like a proto-state.
The key challenge for ISIS, after it announced itself to be the "Caliphate" under the leadership of al-Baghdadi is sustainability. The group may, because of its ultra-violence, self destruct or may linger on as a residual and rump force it has essentially changed the character and nature of global jihad, so much so that Al-Qaeda, the group's progenitor, has been left scrambling to catch up. ISIS seeks a violent confrontation with the West; its provocative attacks and beheadings and the capture of symbolic towns like Dabiq where, according to Sunni eschatology, the end of time will occur with the arrival of the Mahdi, reflects the apocalyptic nature of the group.
A multi-pronged strategy
By way of recommendations and suggestions in dealing with ISIS, Stern and Berger caution Western policy makers and politicians to not be "reactive" or to overreact-- precisely the goals of ISIS which wants the West to be drawn into the Middle East. Stern and Berger propose a holistic approach that synthesizes military, social and political interventions and leads to the "rotting up" of the group.
Stern and Berger propose a holistic approach that synthesizes military, social and political interventions and leads to the "rotting up" of the group.
Stern and Berger have done a fantastic job of dissecting ISIS, its ideology, formative premises, its end game, goals and modus operandi. The feat is all the more laudable given the paucity of real information about the group, the dangers of probing and seeking primary sources and other relevant research techniques.
The book then draws from history, takes recourse to analogy, and draws inferences and extrapolates from available sources and information. Vigorous methodologies have been employed to arrive at a description of the group and other ancillary but allied themes. Stern and Berger cannot be faulted for their academic vigour and the copiousness of their research.
But where does Islam figure?
However, while the book is admittedly about ISIS and axiomatically delineates the nature, form and goals of the group, Stern and Berger hardly pay attention to the historical dimensions of the anarchic void that gave birth to it. Moreover, a discussion on Islam has been elided. It is not clear whether this accrues from political correctness or the authors' specializations. The question(s) that could have been discussed at length could have been whether there is Islam in ISIS or is ISIS in Islam?
A discussion on Islam has been elided. It is not clear whether this accrues from political correctness or the authors' specializations.
I personally believe that Islam, or at least certain interpretations of the religion and its history, appears to be employed by ISIS to justify "retribution" against what the group believes to be the source of the Middle East's torturous, convoluted and painful modern history. This selective appropriation of texts and history, while useful for ISIS, is reductive and conveys the impression that Islam is essentially violent. The author challenges this impression but for the Western reader, the best review could perhaps have been provided by Stern and Berger. Alas, neither have chosen to do so which suggests that both authors speak from the vantage point of the West and for the West--an ethnocentrism that is disappointing, to say the least.
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